

# Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

SEP 0 4 1996

RECEIVED

1996 SEP -5 AM 10: 16

DNF SAFETY BOARD

The Honorable John T. Conway Chairman Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 625 Indiana Avenue, NW Suite 700 Washington, DC 20004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter provides a copy of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Final Draft of the "Department Approach for Improving the Technical Expertise/Competence Necessary to Implement the Safety Management System" as promised in my previous letter to you dated August 14, 1996. It also serves to notify you of a change to the Safety Management Implementation Team composition.

Commitment 5.1 of the Department's Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 95-2 required outlining a Department approach for improving the technical expertise/competence necessary to implement the Safety Management System (Approach). An initial draft Approach was developed on July 11, 1996, as required by the Implementation Plan. The final draft Approach, which is delineated in Enclosure 1, incorporates resolution of DNFSB staff comments on the outcome documents from the DOE/DNFSB Off-Site June 13-14, 1996 conference.

The Safety Management Implementation Team and other key Department management are completing their final review of Enclosure 1 in anticipation of meeting the final Implementation Plan commitment for the Approach. We would appreciate receiving any further comments the Board or Board Staff may have prior to September 11, 1996, so we may address your comments before issuing the final paper.

The Core Team member from Rocky Flats is being changed to Michael Weis. A revised Safety Management Implementation Team roster is included as Enclosure 2. This roster also includes site Points of Contact for the four operations offices with priority facilities which do not have members on the Core Team.

J. T. Conway 2 SEP 0 4 1996

If you should have any questions on these matters please call me at (202) 586-1418.

Sincerely,

Frank R. McCoy, HI

Director, Safety Management Implementation Team

CC:

Thomas P. Grumbly, US Mark B. Whitaker, S3.1

#### Enclosures:

- (1) Department Approach for Improving the Technical Expertise/Competence Necessary to Implement the Safety Management System
- (2) Safety Management Implementation Team Roster

96/3546

RECEIVED
1996 SEP -5 AN 10: 17
DNF SAFETY BOARD

#### WHITE PAPER

DEPARTMENT APPROACH FOR IMPROVING THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE/COMPETENCE NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 95-2

Commitment 5.1

Safety Management Implementation Team

August 29, 1996

FINAL DRAFT

# DEPARTMENT APPROACH FOR IMPROVING THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE/COMPETENCE NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

In the Department's Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) Recommendation 95-2, Commitment 5.1 required the Department to outline an approach for improving the technical expertise/competence necessary to implement the Safety Management System. Aspects of the outline were to include: identification of areas of deficiencies; use of Excepted Service Authority to supplement areas of technical deficiencies; training and qualification programs to develop expertise; and revisions, as necessary, to the qualification standards for the Department's Technical Qualification Program.

Subsequent to this Commitment, the Under Secretary initiated a joint conference between the Department's Senior Management and the Board on June 13-14, 1996 to address the Department's critical technical staffing needs. The Under Secretary documented the outcome of the conference in his Memorandum to the Board dated July 29,1996 which is provided as Attachment 1. This memorandum contains a conference summary and a detailed Action Plan. The Action Plan provides the approach that the Department will follow in improving the technical expertise/competence of the senior technical safety management and staff and addresses the aspects of the outline required by Commitment 5.1. The resulting actions effectively implemented, will fully meet Commitment 5.1 of the 95-2 Implementation Plan. The attachment details the following initiatives:

Promulgate Department Policy to re-emphasize the primary role of technical managers; П Identify competency criteria for critical technical safety management positions; Review the adequacy of the Department's Technical Manager and Project Manager Qualification Standards; Π Develop a model of a Senior Safety Management position; П Identify critical unmet needs for technical subject matter expert and safety management positions; Establish a supporting infrastructure to institutionalize stability and continuity; Π Develop a Manager's Handbook modeled after the Administrative Flexibilities Handbook; П Identify an "alter-eqo" for each Operations Office and Headquarters Organization to support personnel actions for

technical personnel;

		Develop	а	pilot	program	for	dual	career	tracks;	and
--	--	---------	---	-------	---------	-----	------	--------	---------	-----

Conduct a second joint DOE/DNFSB Off-Site Conference to review actions taken and progress achieved.

For those technical personnel not affected by the actions of the Under Secretary's Action Plan, the Department continues to take steps to improve their technical competence through the Technical Qualification Program. This Program, established by the Implementation Plan for Board Recommendation 93-3, Improved Technical Competence, will revise competencies in qualification standards as necessary to ensure the Qualification Standards provide the technical competencies required to effectively implement the Safety Management System.

This final paper updates the actions from the Off-Site Conference that were agreed upon since the original draft of this paper was issued on July 11, 1996. This paper also addresses the Department's approach to meet near-term technical needs for implementing the Safety Management System.

While these activities are ongoing the Department will continue to utilize its technical expertise and experience base to effectively implement an integrated safety management system. In instances where technical expertise is needed but not readily available the following approach would be taken.

- Use the Core Technical Group database to identify and share expertise;
- Use technical personnel experienced in conducting Operational Readiness Reviews;
- Use the laboratories and universities to acquire or provide expertise; and
- Use technical expertise obtained from contracted services.

#### CORE TECHNICAL GROUP (CTG)

The logical step for acquiring technical talent for the near term safety management needs is to first look to the Core Technical Group for support.

The Defense Programs (DP) CTG has been fully operational since 7/1/96 and currently has over 350 CTG candidate names in its database in 26 functional areas (ES&H disciplines). Between 4/28 and 7/1/96 the CTG operated in a limited fashion and completed five pilots to assure that it would be effective when it went fully operational on 7/1/96. Since going operational, the CTG has completed several technical tasks and several remain ongoing. CTG

utilization will increase as more dedicated marketing is applied and its effectiveness increases.

While the CTG, to date, consists primarily of DP candidates and has been for DP customer use, it is noted that consistent with the 95-2 implementation plan Environmental Management is developing a list of technical candidates for CTG use. These candidates will be added to the CTG roster and be made available to support Safety Management needs throughout the complex. In the interim, DP has and will continue to provide technical support as requested in areas implementation of integrated safety management activities (ORRs, seismic support, authorization basis, etc). It is also important to note that if the CTG cannot find an available candidate to meet the technical requirements of the customer, it seeks such from other programs (Environmental Management, Energy Research, and Nuclear Energy) and their field sites, and if appropriate, will as a last resort employ the use of support service contractors.

DP identified 37 unmet technical staffing needs that, once filled, would supplement the CTG in the existing and enduring work areas(authorization basis, criticality safety, fire protection, and nuclear weapons safety) as a part in meeting commitment 5.1 of the implementation plan. Only a small percentage of the 37 would be located at Headquarters with the majority located in the Field.

Our path forward relative to Commitment 5.2 consists of a briefing to the Board on the CTG concept prior to delivery of the Action Plan to assure a clear understanding of the CTG process. The Action Plan is due in December 1996.

#### **NEAR TERM APPROACH**

Mr. Richard Crowe, a 95-2 Safety Management Implementation Team member, will be leading the assist visits and subsequent safety management validations at facilities. His current responsibilities were recently changed to include quiding the development, implementation and use of the Core Technical Group. Depending on needs for Safety Management support in the complex, the Department will first review the CTG member list for technical support personnel. The Department will also strongly rely on the use of experienced Operational Readiness Review Team members with demonstrated experience in key technical areas. In addition the Department will use personnel from laboratories, universities and contract resources as necessary. When the CTG matures, the use of support services contractors will decline. As this occurs the Department will be able to better develop the process for utilizing Core Technical Group personnel and formalize the process for meeting near term technical needs in the complex.

increasing technical expertise through:
 The use of Excepted Service Authority;
 The Training and Qualification Program initiated under 93-3 and mandated by Order 360.1, Training;
 Effective use of candidates completing the Department's Technical Leadership Development Program;
 Use of specialty programs being developed in the Department to meet critical skill needs; and
 Implementing the actions resulting from the Joint Off-Site

During this implementing period the Department will be adding and

The combination of the Department's short-term and long-term actions comprise the Department's approach for improving the technical expertise/competence necessary to implement the safety management system.

initiatives are included as Attachment 1.

Conference between the Board and the Department. These



## The Under Secretary of Energy Washington, DC 20585 July 29, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

**DEFENSE PROGRAMS** 

**ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR** 

**ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH** 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

**ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT** 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

**HUMAN RESOURCES AND ADMINISTRATION** 

ASSOCIATE DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR

FIELD MANAGEMENT

**OPERATIONS OFFICE MANAGERS** 

FROM:

THOMAS P. GRUMBLY

SUBJECT:

Joint Department of Energy and Defense Nuclear

Facilities Safety Board Off-Site Conference Summary

and Action Plan

At a joint off-site conference on June 13 and 14, 1996, the Department and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) agreed that the improvement of safety management and technical competence throughout the complex needed to be addressed on several fronts. A Conference Summary and an Action Plan, enumerating specific actions and timeframes discussed at the conference, were subsequently drafted in consultation with two Board Members. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you copies of the Conference Summary and Action Plan.

Work has already begun on several of the initiatives described in the Action Plan. Arch Durham's June 26, 1996, memorandum to you requested input necessary to move forward on the Action Items dealing with critical Federal technical nuclear safety needs. The information provided by Program, Operations, and Field Offices in response to this memorandum enabled the Department to meet its first deliverable date, and form the basis for meeting further commitments outlined in the Action Plan.

It is critical that the Department keep its commitments, and this can only be done by our continuing to work together in a corporate manner in coordinating the actions necessary to improve technical work force competency. Your continued attention to, and support on, these technical work force initiatives is greatly appreciated. If you or your staff require additional information or assistance, please call Tim Dirks (202-586-5610), or Tom Evans (202-426-1506).

#### **Attachments**

cc: Administrative Contacts
Servicing Personnel Offices
Technical Personnel Coordinating Committee

## BACKGROUND:

A joint, off-site conference was held by representatives of the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) on June 13 and 14, 1996, to discuss technical workforce competency issues related to the DOE's safety management program at defense nuclear facilities. A brief summary of the conference is attached. The issue of ensuring that DOE has adequate numbers of technically competent personnel, as both subject matter experts and technical managers, was addressed from both a short- and long-term point of view. The preliminary course of action that resulted from the meeting, along with discussion intended to place the issues and commitments in context, is presented below.

#### **ACTION ITEM 1**

Discussion:

The role of the Federal employee in the DOE defense nuclear complex needs to reflect ownership of issues related to safety management of Departmental facilities. DOE Federal employees must be able to provide technical direction and guidance to the contractors, who carry out DOE activities, and review contractor performance to ensure that personnel are performing the roles and responsibilities assigned to them by contract. This responsibility can be shared, but DOE's portion is not diminished.

One proposed means of delivery for this philosophy would be as a Policy or Guidance Statement included in the upcoming revision to the DOE Manual of Functions, Assignments, and Responsibilities for Nuclear Safety (FAR Manual). The Policy Statement might include the following elements in providing technical guidance to the contractors: (1) methods for providing technical direction (rules, orders, manuals, standards, guides, letters); (2) appropriate level of DOE functions and responsibilities depending on the work and associated hazards; (3) contractual terms and conditions; (4) means to ensure all important viewpoints have been considered (e.g., field and Headquarters); and, (5) mechanisms to monitor/ensure contractor performance vis-a-vis the direction provided.

Action:

Develop a policy to improve understanding that the primary role of Federal technical managers is to be responsible and accountable for performing work in a manner that protects the environment, safety, and health at DOE facilities. The Policy Statement would be included in the upcoming revision to the DOE Functions, Assignments, and Responsibilities (FAR) Manual.

Lead Responsibility: Peter Brush Deliverable Date: 8/15/96

#### **ACTION ITEM 2**

Discussion:

The need for DOE's senior technical safety managers to be technically competent was discussed at great length. DOE needs leaders with demonstrated technical competence. These technical leaders should be expected to provide guidance to contractors from the outset, and tie the DOE safety management system to work in the complex. As a working figure, approximately 100 to 200 positions requiring such technical management competencies are estimated to exist within the defense nuclear complex.

It was concluded that personnel filling these positions must have "proven technical expertise," and that this means that they had to have successfully performed in a technical position(s) in the past, general management expertise alone simply would not do.

Action:

Senior technical safety management positions (generally GS-15 and above) will be identified, including SES positions that are technical in nature and have major safety management functions and responsibilities. Operations and Field Office Managers & Principal Secretarial Officers (PSO's) will prepare an initial list, estimated to total between 100-200 positions Department-wide, in response to a call memorandum. This list will then be reviewed for internal consistency and finalized. Detailed technical competency criteria will be developed by PSO's and Operations and Field Office Managers for each of the identified positions and actions will be initiated to ensure that individuals filling these positions, whether incumbents or candidates for new or vacant positions, meet the technical management competency criteria. The processes and results of this initiative will be vetted by a high level review group who, following collaboration with PSO's and Operations and Field Office Managers, will provide recommendations as needed to the Under Secretary.

'Lead Responsibility: Tim Dirks

Subitem A: Call Memorandum to Managers/PSO's

Responsibility: Tim Dirks
Deliverable Date: 6/25/96

## ACTION ITEM 2 (cont.)

Subitem B: Response from Managers/PSO's

Responsibility: Operations and Field Office Managers/PSO's

Deliverable Date: 7/22/96

Subitem C: Finalize List

Responsibility: Under Secretary (based on Review Group recommendations)

Deliverable Date: 9/96

Subitem D: Develop Position Specific Technical Competency Criteria/Evaluate

Incumbents -

Responsibility: Operations and Field Office Managers/PSO's or Representatives

Deliverable Date: 11/96

Subitem E: Perform Review of PSO/Operations and Field Office Manager's

Recommendations and Finalize Technical Competency Criteria/

**Incumbent Evaluation** 

Responsibility: Review Group

Deliverable Date: 12/96

Subitem F: Initiate Appropriate Action

Responsibility: Operations and Field Office Managers/PSO's or Representatives

Deliverable Date: 1/97 and ongoing

## **ACTION ITEM 3**

Discussion: It was concluded that technical managers and project managers (as defined under

the Recommendation 93-3), must have proven technical expertise, and that this meant that they had to have demonstrated successful performance in a technical position(s) in the past; general management expertise alone will not do. This

Action Item is closely related to Action Items 2, 4, and 5.

Action: In coordination with Action Item #4, reevaluate the Technical Manager and

Project Management Qualification standards to consider inclusion of additional technical competencies and/or redefining these standards as "secondary standards," thereby requiring qualification in another Functional Area prior to commencing

Technical Manager or Project Management.

Lead Responsibility: Tom Evans
Deliverable Date: 10/31/96

### **ACTION ITEM 4**

Discussion: In order to evaluate incumbents in, or candidates for, the 100-200 senior technical

safety managers described in Action Item 2, it is first necessary to understand what standards apply to them. Fleshing out expectations and providing them to those who will be developing detailed technical competency criteria and evaluating the

incumbents in, or candidates for, the 100 to 200 senior technical safety management positions (see Action Item 2) are the goals of this Action Item.

Safety responsibilities and accountability will also be considered.

Action: Develop a model of a Senior Technical Safety Management position that will be

made available for use throughout the Department to enhance technical workforce

competency.

Lead Responsibility: Vic Stello

Deliverable Date: 9/30/96

#### **ACTION ITEM 5**

Discussion:

It was agreed that the Department needs to identify its critical unmet needs in terms of senior technical safety management and technical subject matter expert positions. As a working figure, at least 35 to 50 of these critical technical positions are estimated to exist within the defense nuclear complex. Following the evaluation of senior technical safety management positions there may be additional critical unmet needs identified. The possible need for these additional critical technical personnel will not be unduly impeded by the internal requirements of the Strategic Alignment Initiative and/or budget reductions imposed on the Department.

The pace of hiring any required technical people should not be driven by numerical goals. While it is a safety imperative that these individuals be brought onboard as soon as practicable, haste in hiring could result in an insufficiently selective process. A working goal of December 1996 was set for having the first individual hiring decisions made, as appropriate.

Action:

Identify critical unmet needs for senior technical safety management and technical subject matter expert positions. Managers/PSO's will prioritize requirements based on criticality and identify those that must be met in CY 1996 and begin planning for those that should be filled in future years. The list will be vetted and finalized by the high level review group established under Action Item 2. Managers/PSO's will make individual determinations for each position regarding whether critical needs can best be met through reassignment, internal retraining, or hiring. The possibility of shifting some Headquarters positions to the field will be considered in addressing these needs.

Lead Responsibility: Tom Evans

Subitem A: Input to Managers/PSO Call Memorandum

Responsibility: Tom Evans
Deliverable Date: 6/25/96

Subitem B: Response from Managers/PSO's

Responsibility: Operations and Field Office Managers/PSO's

Deliverable Date: 7/22/96

## ACTION ITEM 5 (cont.)

Subitem C:

Finalize List

Responsibility:

Review Group

Deliverable Date:

8/19/96

Subitem D:

Initiate Appropriate Actions to Address Prioritized Critical Unmet

Needs

Responsibility:

Operations and Field Office Managers/PSO's

Deliverable Date:

10/96

These actions coordinated with Action Item 2.

#### **ACTION ITEM 6**

Discussion:

A supporting infrastructure needs to be created that will ensure the long-term continuing success of the Department's safety management programs and initiatives to improve DOE's technical competence. A plan needs to be developed that institutionalizes a comprehensive program with both short- and long-term initiatives. Consideration should be made for developing such a program that could be presented to Congress. In addition, the possibility of the issuance of an Executive Order on Nuclear Safety for DOE should be considered.

Action:

Determine methods to institutionalize stability and continuity

- a. Lay out case for need.
- b. Operationalize Program plans and measurables
- c. Identify third parties to conduct objective review
- d. Develop plan/presentation for Congress.
- e. Revisit idea of Executive Order on Nuclear Safety

Lead Responsibility:

Under Secretary with Primary Support from EH and Office of Policy

Deliverable Date:

12/96

## ACTION ITEM 7

Discussion:

The information available to management and Human Resources officials at Headquarters and in the field to accomplish effective technical personnel recruitment and retention may not be well understood in all quarters and, as a result, existing personnel flexibilities may not be fully utilized in support of a technically competent workforce.

Action:

Develop a Manager's Handbook, modeled on the current Administrative Flexibilities Handbook, with a strong introductory memorandum from the Under Secretary, on how to improve technical competence (i.e., how to raise the technical excellence bar) using the full range of personnel-related tools. The Handbook will provide user friendly advice and information on how to make the best use of existing tools to accomplish this.

Lead Responsibility: Tim Dirks
Deliverable Date: 11/96

### <u>ACTION ITEM 8</u>

Discussion:

Proper implementation of the Action Items developed at the Off-Site Conference will require that Operations and Field Office Managers and PSO's have an "alter ego," who should normally be a technical line manager who ensures that all personnel actions involving technical personnel under the Manager's/PSO's purview help raise the technical competence of the Department. It was recognized that in some instances the "alter ego" might not have a technical background.

Technical line management needs to be directly involved, with support and assistance from Human Resources and Administration personnel, in the hiring of technical personnel.

The purpose of the "alter ego" position will be to ensure that issues such as: aggressive recruitment for open positions, interviewing of potential candidates, training program status, development of education programs, and the like, are pursued vigorously and in a systematic and effective manner. The "alter ego" must be in place to support the hiring activity possible as a result of Action Item 5. It was recognized that a proven technical line manager was highly preferable for such a position; that such personnel might not exist at present at each Operations and Field Office and Headquarters organization, and that this tasking might not amount to a full time job.

Action:

Identify an "alter ego" for Operations and Field Offices and Headquarters organizations who will be the Manager's/PSO's authority in the hiring processes, including interviewing and recommending selections. This individual will work closely with the Manager/PSO to assess critical needs, develop staffing and training plans, oversee the hiring process, and develop resource management strategies to address identified needs.

Lead Responsibility: Each Manager/PSO

Deliverable Date: 7/22/96

## **ACTION ITEM 9**

Discussion:

Recommendation 93-3 recommended that DOE "... establish the attraction and retention of scientific and technical personnel of exceptional qualities as a primary agency-wide goal." At the conference, it was recognized that additional effort should be exerted in order to retain these highly competent and performing personnel. To address this issue, it was suggested that a pilot dual career path program be established at an Operations Office. The program would be directed toward providing an attractive career path to high-quality technical personnel demonstrating superior performance and potential for advancement.

Action:

Jointly develop a pilot program that will establish dual career tracks that include an additional available career path for technical personnel that allows progression to senior levels in technical positions, based on demonstrated performance and technical excellence.

Lead Responsibility: Tim Dirks/John Wagoner

Deliverable Date:

1/97

## **ACTION ITEM 10**

Discussion:

All of the senior members present, both from DOE and the Board, recognized the overriding importance of "... the attraction and retention of scientific and technical personnel of exceptional qualities as a primary agency-wide goal." [Recommendation 93-3]. In this light, continued focus and aggressive action is required to ensure success.

Action:

Conduct a second joint DOE/Board Off-Site Conference. Schedule the conference in mid-December 1996 to review actions taken and progress achieved in conjunction with the June DOE/Board Off-Site Conference, and to discuss other matters of mutual interest.

Lead Responsibility: Tim Dirks/Ken Pusateri (Board General Manager)

Deliverable Date:

12/96

## JOINT DOE/BOARD OFF-SITE CONFERENCE SUMMARY

Senior members of the Department of Energy and two members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board met for a two day conference to address DOE's critical technical staffing needs. The conference, led by the Under Secretary of Energy and Board Members DiNunno and Crawford, began a serious dialog to develop a common understanding of workforce problems at the Department of Energy and discuss possible means for addressing them.

Four presentations were made during the Conference: DOE and Board presentations of major technical work force issues; an update regarding Department resources; and a discussion of strategies regarding personnel/training-related tools and authorities. (Reference papers from these presentations will be accessible in August via the internet (World Wide Web) on the Office of the Departmental Representative's forthcoming home page.) During the presentations several topics were identified as problems. These topics were prioritized and a manageable list of three problems were identified for further consideration and discussion:

- 1) Role of the Federal work force and government contractors.
- 2) "Raising the bar" for Federal employees
- 3) Establishing stability and continuity

A short summary of each problem and the proposed means for addressing them is provided below.

## Role of the Federal Work Force and Government Contractors.

It was noted that, in recent years, the mission of the Department of Energy's defense nuclear complex has changed from one of nuclear weapon design and production to one of stockpile stewardship, facility transition, waste management, and environmental restoration. As the mission changes, it was agreed that the Federal employee should continue to demonstrate ownership of the complex. However, it was noted that the role of the Federal employee in demonstrating ownership and the degree to which direction is provided is dependent upon the operation being managed.

The proposed method of addressing this issue was to develop a policy statement which would be included in an upcoming revision to the DOE Manual of Functions, Assignments, and Responsibilities for Nuclear Safety (FAR Manual). The policy statement would provide guidance to answer questions regarding the proper use of contractors; the meaning of ownership/stewardship of the defense nuclear complex; and methods and extent of providing technical direction.

## JOINT DOE/BOARD OFF-SITE CONFERENCE SUMMARY

## "Raising the Bar" for Federal Employees

"Raising the bar" refers to the need to identify and establish competency criteria for technical personnel whose duties and responsibilities can affect safety at defense nuclear facilities.

In order to identify criteria, positions and the associated performance standards must first be identified. Two specific levels of technical employees were discussed. The first level consisted of personnel managing technical issues within the defense nuclear complex. As a working figure, it was assumed that 100 to 200 managers would fit into this level. The discussion identified several traits for these senior technical safety manager positions:

- Leadership
- Demonstrated technical competence
- Interdisciplinary experience
- Management skills

The proposed solution for this part of the problem was to have Operations Office Managers and Headquarters Line management review their organizations and identify the key technical safety management positions. Some new positions might be identified during this review. Once the positions have been identified, duties and responsibilities could be defined for each position from which knowledge and performance criteria could be established. After positions and criteria have been identified, incumbents would be reviewed against the results to determine actions required to ensure adequate management of safety issues. Several tools were identified for ensuring technical managers would be up to the challenges they face. These included:

- Retraining incumbent managers to provide skills necessary to meet the position's criteria
- Hire a new employee who meets the position's criteria
- Internally reassign personnel to obtain a manager who meets the position's criteria
- Provide a technical subject matter expert to supplement the manager in areas of weakness

The second level of technical employees consisted of subject matter experts. Technical managers must have access to these subject matter experts to interact with contractor experts and provide advice to the manager regarding project or facility technical issues. A short term need to fill critical technical positions was identified. For discussion purposes, DOE management estimated that 35 to 50 additional technical positions are needed to address technical safety issues within the complex. However, senior Line and Field managers would need to review their organizations and identify areas/positions where additional personnel are needed. Following the evaluation of senior technical safety management positions there may be additional critical unmet needs identified. Input would be collected and reviewed to develop a list of critical needs and assign the necessary FTE positions to fill those needs.

## JOINT DOE/BOARD OFF-SITE CONFERENCE SUMMARY

Although several tools were identified for obtaining technical personnel, it was noted that excepted service hiring authority would be an excellent tool for quickly filling these critical needs. It was also noted that Strategic Alignment Initiatives would not restrict the Department's ability to hire additional personnel to fill the critical needs for technical personnel.

## Establishing Stability and Continuity

This topic arose from observations regarding the stability of the Naval Reactors program. It was noted that a supporting infrastructure needs to be created which ensures the long-term continuing success of programs to improve DOE's technical competence in managing technical issues. A plan needs to be developed that institutionalizes a comprehensive program with both short-term and long-term initiatives. Several avenues were discussed to achieve this objective, and will be investigated further by Department personnel.

Closing remarks from the Under Secretary and both Board Members indicated it was felt that progress had been made toward identifying the near-term problems faced by the Department and describing possible methods of addressing them. This conference would be the first in a series of such discussions. Future discussions would be necessary to monitor progress on action items resulting from the first conference and address topics which could not be addressed within the time allotted.

# **Safety Management Implementation Team**

#### **Core Team**

Frank McCoy, Director

Charles Billups (ER)

Dick Crowe (DP)

Charles O'Dell (EM)

Tom Evans (HR)

John Hobbs (ID)

Joe King (DP)

Sue King (AAO)

Marty Mathamel (EH)

Emil Morrow (DP)

Dan Rose (AL)

Michael Weis (RF)

Craig Zamuda (FE)

#### **Other Site Points of Contact**

RT Brock (SR)

Charles Hansen (RL)

Bob Poe (OR)

Charles Simkins (OAK)

RECEIVED

1996 SEP -5 M D 18